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NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 1999||Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union|
with Jürgen von Hagen
in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, James M. Poterba and Jürgen von Hagen, editors
|December 1997||Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union|
with Jurgen von Hagen: w6341
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are" likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because" they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its" disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor" spending ministers and punish those who defect' in a process we label delegation procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have" plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with" proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability" to monitor and punish the ...
- Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance. Poterba, James M., and Jurgenvon Hagen, eds., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999,pp. 209-232.
- Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union, Mark Hallerberg, Jürgen von Hagen. in Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, Poterba and von Hagen. 1999