TY  - JOUR
AU  - Baker,Michael
AU  - Hanna,Emily
AU  - Kantarevic,Jasmin
TI  - The Married Widow: Marriage Penalties Matter!
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 9782
PY  - 2003
Y2  - June 2003
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9782
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9782.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Michael Baker
Department of Economics
University of Toronto
150 St. George Street
Toronto, ON M5S 3G7
CANADA
Tel: 416/978-4138
Fax: 416/978-6713
E-Mail: baker@chass.utoronto.ca

emily hanna
E-Mail: emilyhanna07@gmail.com

Jasmin Kantarevic
E-Mail: jasmin_kantarevic@oma.org
AB  - Marriage penalties are a controversial feature of many government policies. Empirical evidence of their behavioral effects is quite mixed. This is surprising because economic theory predicts that they should have an impact on the headship decision. We investigate the removal of marriage penalties from the surviving spouse pensions of the Canadian public pension system in the 1980s. These reforms provide a simple and transparent source of identification. Our results indicate that marriage penalties can have large and persistent effects on marriage decisions. We also present evidence suggesting that it is individuals with characteristics correlated with greater wealth who respond to the penalties.
ER  -