@techreport{NBERw9747,
 title = "Implementing Optimal Policy through Inflation-Forecast Targeting",
 author = "Lars E. O. Svensson and Michael Woodford",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "9747",
 year = "2003",
 month = "June",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w9747",
 abstract = {We examine to what extent variants of inflation-forecast targeting can avoid stabilization bias, incorporate history-dependence, and achieve determinancy of equilibrium, so as to reproduce a socially optimal equilibrium. We also evaluate these variants in terms of the transparency of the connection with the ultimate policy goals and the robustness to model perturbations. A suitably designed inflation-forecast targeting rule can achieve the social optimum and at the same time have a more transparent connection to policy goals and be more robust than competing instrument rules.},
}