NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Spaghetti Regionalism or Strategic Foreign Trade: Some Evidence for Mexico

Alejandro Ibarra-Yunez

NBER Working Paper No. 9692
Issued in May 2003
NBER Program(s):   ITI

After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina. Criticism of multiple regional trade agreements (RTAs) arises from a consistency test, but also from the ability of a country to administer them. Mexico's multiple agreements have generally used the principle of NAFTA consistency, after the acceptance that NAFTA became a broader and deeper accord than results of the Uruguay multilateral achievements. An analysis of multiple RTAs is presented, including a game model of equilibrium, along with a political economy approach of why Mexico seeks multiple RTAs as its foreign trade policy.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w9692

Published: Ibarra-Yunez, Alejandro. "Spaghetti Regionalism Or Strategic Trade: Some Evidence For Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, 2003, v72(2,Dec), 567-584.

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