NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

An Equilibrium Analysis of Real Estate

Steven R. Grenadier

NBER Working Paper No. 9475
Issued in February 2003
NBER Program(s):   AP

This paper provides a unified equilibrium approach to valuing a wide variety of commercial real estate lease contracts. Using a game-theoretic variant of real options analysis, the underlying real estate asset market is modeled as a continuous-time Nash equilibrium in which developers make construction decisions under demand uncertainty. Then, using the economic notion that leasing simply represents the purchase of the use of the asset over a specified time frame, I use a contingent-claims approach to value many of the most common real estate leasing arrangements. In particular, the model provides closed-form solutions for the equilibrium valuation of leases with options to purchase, pre-leasing, gross and net leases, leases with cancellation options, ground leases, escalation clauses, lease concessions and sale-leasebacks.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w9475

Published: Grenadier, Steven R. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Real Estate Leases." The Journal of Business 78, 4 (2005).

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