NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Catching Cheating Teachers: The Results of an Unusual Experiment in Implementing Theory

Brian A. Jacob, Steven D. Levitt

NBER Working Paper No. 9414
Issued in January 2003
NBER Program(s):   CH   LE   PE   ED

This paper reports on the results of a prospective implementation of methods for detecting teacher cheating. In Spring 2002, over 100 Chicago Public Schools elementary classrooms were selected for retesting based on the cheating detection algorithm. Classrooms prospectively identified as likely cheaters experienced large test score declines. In contrast, classes that had large test score gains on the original test, but were prospectively identified as being unlikely to have cheated, maintained their original gains. Randomly selected classrooms also maintained their gains. The cheating detection tools were thus demonstrated to be effective in distinguishing between classrooms that achieved large test-score gains as a consequence of cheating versus those whose gains were the result of outstanding teaching. In addition, the data generated by the implementation experiment highlight numerous ways in which the original cheating detection methods can be improved in the future.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w9414

Published: Gale, William G. and Janet Rothenberg Pack (eds.) Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs 2003. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.

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