TY  - JOUR
AU  - Chari,V. V.
AU  - Kehoe,Patrick J.
TI  - Time Consistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 9370
PY  - 2002
Y2  - December 2002
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9370
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9370.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Varadarajan V. Chari
Department of Economics
University of Minnesota
1035 Heller Hall
271 - 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Tel: 612/626-5171
Fax: (612) 624-0209
E-Mail: varadarajanvchari@gmail.com

Patrick Kehoe
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN  55480-0291
Tel: 612/204-5525
Fax: 612/204-5515
E-Mail: pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.us
AB  - We analyze the setting of monetary and nonmonetary policies in monetary unions. We show that in these unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free- rider problem in the setting of nonmonetary policies, such as labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation. The free-rider problem leads the union's members to pursue lax nonmonetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. The free-rider problem can be mitigated by imposing constraints on the nonmonetary policies, like unionwide rules on labor market policy, debt constraints on members' fiscal policy, and unionwide regulation of banks. When there is no time inconsistency problem, there is no free-rider problem, and constraints on nonmonetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful.
ER  -