NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Minimum Asset Requirements

Steven Shavell

NBER Working Paper No. 9335
Issued in November 2002
NBER Program(s):   LE

Requirements that parties have assets of at least a minimum level in order to participate in an activity are frequently imposed. A principal rationale for minimum asset requirements is considered in this article potential injurers have stronger incentives to prevent harm, or not to engage in harmful activities, provided that they have at least the required level of assets at stake if they are sued for causing harm. The optimal minimum asset requirement generally reflects a tradeoff between this advantage and the disadvantage that some parties with assets below a required level ought to engage in the activity (because the benefits they would obtain exceed the expected harm they would cause). Additionally, it is emphasized that minimum asset requirements are socially desirable only when the victims of harm are not customers of firms. When victims of harm are customers of firms, minimum asset requirements are socially undesirable.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w9335

Published: Shavell, Steven. "Minimum Asset Requirements And Compulsory Liability Insurances As Solutions To The Judgment-Proof Problem," Rand Journal of Economics, 2005, v36(1,Spring), 63-77.

 
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