TY - JOUR AU - Kenkel,Donald S. AU - Reed,Robert R.,III AU - Wang,Ping TI - Rational Addiction, Peer Externalities and Long Run Effects of Public Policy JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 9249 PY - 2002 Y2 - October 2002 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9249 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9249.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Donald S. Kenkel Department of Policy Analysis and Management College of Human Ecology Cornell University Martha Van Rensselaer Hall Ithaca, NY 14853-4401 Tel: 607/255-2594 Fax: 607/255-0799 E-Mail: dsk10@cornell.edu Ping Wang Department of Economics Washington University in St. Louis Campus Box 1208 One Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 Tel: 314/935-5632 Fax: 314/935-4156 E-Mail: pingwang@wustl.edu AB - The main purpose of this research is to understand the patterns of consumption of addictive goods, their economic and welfare consequences for society and the long-run effect of tax policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model of rational addiction. In contrast to prior research, we allow individuals to make their consumption decisions simultaneous with savings and labor supply. When addictive goods have a stronger habit formation effect (an addiction effect'), individuals choose to save less due to the anticipated adverse health consequences of addiction (a detrimental health effect'). This is particularly important since total savings pins down future productivity in the economy. We also consider the role of peer influence in the choice of addiction and find that more peer pressure' raises addictive consumption, lowers savings and reduces productivity. In light of the various distortions associated with addiction, we conclude by studying the long-run effects of an excise tax on addictive goods. Our calibration exercises suggest that incorporating capital formation and peer effects in a model of rational addiction are crucial for the design of public policy. In particular, accounting for peer externalities increases the optimal sin tax rate by more than 50 percent. ER -