TY - JOUR AU - Acemoglu,Daron AU - Johnson,Simon AU - Robinson,James AU - Thaicharoen,Yunyong TI - Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 9124 PY - 2002 Y2 - August 2002 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9124 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9124.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Daron Acemoglu Department of Economics MIT, E52-380B 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 Tel: 617/253-1927 Fax: 617/253-1330 E-Mail: daron@mit.edu Simon Johnson MIT Sloan School of Management 100 Main Street, E52-562 Cambridge, MA 02142 Tel: 617/290-9618 Fax: 617/253-2660 E-Mail: sjohnson@mit.edu James A. Robinson Harvard University Department of Government N309, 1737 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Tel: 617/496-2839 Fax: 617/495-0438 E-Mail: jrobinson@gov.harvard.edu Yunyong Thaicharoen E-Mail: yunyongt@bot.or.th AB - Countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies, including high inflation, large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates, appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more slowly during the postwar period. Does this reflect the causal effect of these macroeconomic policies on economic outcomes? One reason to suspect that the answer may be no is that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also have weak 'institutions,' including political institutions that do not constrain politicians and political elites, ineffective enforcement of property rights for investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability. This paper documents that countries that inherited more 'extractive' instit utions from their colonial past were more likely to experience high volatility a nd economic crises during the postwar period. More specifically, societies where European colonists faced high mortality rates more than 100 years ago are much more volatile and prone to crises. Based on our previous work, we interpret this relationship as due to the causal effect of institutions on economic outcomes: Europeans did not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions in areas where they faced high mortality. Once we control for the effect of institutions, macroeconomic policies appear to have only a minor impact on volatility and crises. This suggests that distortionary macroeconomic policies are more likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional problems rather than the main causes of economic volatility, and also that the effects of institutional differences on volatility do not appear to be primarily mediated by any of the standard macroeconomic variables. Instead, it appears that weak institutions cause volatility through a number of microeconomic, as well as macroeconomic, channels. ER -