TY  - JOUR
AU  - Figueiredo,John M. de
AU  - Silverman,Brian S.
TI  - Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 9064
PY  - 2002
Y2  - July 2002
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9064
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9064.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
John M. de Figueiredo
The Law School and Fuqua School
Duke University
210 Science Drive, Box 90360
Durham, NC 27708
Tel: 919-613-8513
E-Mail: jdefig@law.duke.edu
AB  - Despite a large literature on lobbying and information transmission by interest groups, no prior study has measured returns to lobbying.  In this paper, we statistically estimate the returns to lobbying by universities for educational earmarks (which now represent 10 percent of federal funding of university research).  The returns to lobbying approximate zero for universities not represented by a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) or House Appropriations Committee (HAC).  However, the average lobbying university with representation on the SAC receives an average return to one dollar of lobbying of $11-$17; lobbying universities with representation on the HAC obtain $20-$36 for each dollar spent. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that lobbying universities with SAC or HAC representation set the marginal benefit of lobbying equal to its marginal cost, although the large majority of universities with representation on the HAC and SAC do not lobby, and thus do not take advantage of their representation in Congress.  On average, 45 percent of universities are predicted to choose the optimal level of lobbying. In addition to addressing questions about the federal funding of university research, we also discuss the impact of our results for the structure of government.
ER  -