TY  - JOUR
AU  - Aghion,Philippe
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Trebbi,Francesco
TI  - Endogenous Political Institutions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 9006
PY  - 2002
Y2  - June 2002
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9006
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w9006.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Philippe Aghion
Department of Economics
Harvard University
1805 Cambridge St
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-6675
Fax: 617/495-4341
E-Mail: paghion@fas.harvard.edu

Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Francesco Trebbi
University of British Columbia
1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC, V6T1Z1
Canada
Tel: 604.218.5900
Fax: 604.822.5915
E-Mail: ftrebbi@mail.ubc.ca
AB  - Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both 'optimal' constitutional design and 'positive' aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.
ER  -