NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Property Rights and Finance

Simon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff

NBER Working Paper No. 8852
Issued in March 2002
NBER Program(s):   CF

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

download in pdf format
   (152 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (152 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w8852

Published: Johnson, Simon, John McMillan and Christoher Woodruff. "Property Rights And Finance," American Economic Review, 2002, v92(5,Dec), 1335-1356.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Levine w11502 Law, Endowments, and Property Rights
Acemoglu and Johnson w9934 Unbundling Institutions
Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff w8572 Courts and Relational Contracts
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson w7771 The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny w5879 Legal Determinants of External Finance
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us