TY  - JOUR
AU  - Pinkowitz,Lee
AU  - Stulz,Rene M.
AU  - Williamson,Rohan
TI  - Corporate Governance and the Home Bias
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8680
PY  - 2001
Y2  - December 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8680
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8680.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Rene M. Stulz
The Ohio State University
Fisher College of Business
806A Fisher Hall
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
Tel: 614/292-1970
Fax: 614/292-2359
E-Mail: stulz_1@cob.osu.edu

Rohan Williamson
Georgetown University
Finance Group
McDonough School of Business
587 Hariri Building
Washington, DC 20057
Tel: 202 687 2284
Fax: 202 687 4031
E-Mail: WILLIARG@georgetown.edu
M2  - featured in NBER digest on 2002-05-01
AB  - In most countries, many of the largest corporations are controlled by large shareholders. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, this stylized fact implies that portfolio holdings of U.S. investors should exhibit a home bias in equilibrium. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders. This available world portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world portfolio of available shares has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics.
ER  -