TY  - JOUR
AU  - Alesina,Alberto
AU  - Angeloni,Ignazio
AU  - Etro,Federico
TI  - Institutional Rules for Federations
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8646
PY  - 2001
Y2  - December 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8646
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8646.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alberto F. Alesina
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center 210
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-8388
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: aalesina@harvard.edu

Ignazio Angeloni
European Central Bank
Postfach 16 03 19
D-60066 Frankfurt am Main
GERMANY
E-Mail: ignazio.angeloni@ecb.int

Federico Etro
E-Mail: adminseg@unive.it
AB  - We study the organization of federations - or international unions - which decide together the provision of certain public goods. The benefit of centralization depends on the internalization of the spillovers, that of decentralization on the adaptability to local differences. We individuate as an optimal institutional design a form of fiscal federalism based on decentralization of expenditures and a system of subsidies and transfers between countries. Since this solution can be politically unfeasible, we study institutional compromises between a centralized federation and a decentralized one. 'Flexible unions' and federal mandates in which both the state and federal levels are involved in providing public goods are typically superior to complete centralization and politically feasible. Finally, we study the effects of a qualified majority voting rule in a centralized system: we find that it can be a useful device to correct a bias toward 'excessive' union level activism.
ER  -