TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bar-Ilan,Avner
AU  - Sacerdote,Bruce
TI  - The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8638
PY  - 2001
Y2  - December 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8638
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8638.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Bruce Sacerdote
6106 Rockefeller Hall
Department of Economics
Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755-3514
Tel: 603/646-2121
Fax: 603/646-2122
E-Mail: Bruce.I.Sacerdote@dartmouth.edu
AB  - We use traffic data from a series of experiments in the United States and Israel to examine how illegal behavior is deterred by various penalty schemes and whether deterrence varies with age, income, driving record and criminal record. We find that red light running decreases sharply in response to an increase in the fine or an increase in the probability of being caught. The elasticity of violations with respect to the fine is larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars. Drivers convicted of violent offenses or property offenses run more red lights on average but have the same elasticity as drivers without a criminal record. Within Israel, members of ethnic minority groups have the smallest elasticity with respect to a fine increase.
ER  -