@techreport{NBERw8588,
 title = "Redistribution through Education and Other Transfer Mechanisms",
 author = "Eric Hanushek and Charles Ka Yui Leung and Kuzey Yilmaz",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "8588",
 year = "2001",
 month = "November",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w8588",
 abstract = {Educational subsidies are frequently justified as a method of altering the income distribution. It is thus natural to compare education to other tax-transfer schemes designed to achieve distributional objectives. While equity-efficiency trade-offs are frequently discussed, they are rarely explicitly treated.  This paper creates a general equilibrium model of school attendance, labor supply, wage determination, and aggregate production, which is used to compare alternative redistribution devices in terms of both deadweight loss and distributional outcomes. A wage subidy generally dominates tuition subsidies in ex ante (or 'opportunity') calculations, but this reverses in ex post (or 'realized') calculations.  Both are generally superior to a negative income tax. With externalities in production, however, there is an unambiguous role for governmental subsidy of education, because it both raises GDP and creates a more equal income distribution.},
}