TY  - JOUR
AU  - Blonigen,Bruce A.
AU  - Bown,Chad P.
TI  - Antidumping and Retaliation Threats
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8576
PY  - 2001
Y2  - November 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8576
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8576.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Bruce Blonigen
Department of Economics
1285 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403-1285
Tel: 541/346-4680
Fax: 541/346-1243
E-Mail: bruceb@uoregon.edu

Chad P. Bown
Development Economics Research Group
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW, MSN MC3-303
Washington, DC 20433 USA
Tel: +1.202.473.9588
E-Mail: cbown@worldbank.org
AB  - This paper examines how the prospect of foreign retaliation affects the antidumping (AD) process in the United States.  We separate the capacity for retaliation into two channels: (i) the capacity for foreign government retaliation under the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT/WTO system, and (ii) the capacity for foreign industry retaliation through reciprocal claims of dumping and the foreign pursuit of AD duties in countries with AD regimes.  Using a nested logit framework and analyzing U.S. AD cases between 1980 and 1998, we find significant empirical evidence consistent with the theory that U.S. industry is influenced by the threat of reciprocal foreign ADDs in its decision of which foreign countries to name in the initial AD petition, and that the U.S. AD authority's antidumping decisions are influenced by the threat of foreign retaliation under the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
ER  -