TY  - JOUR
AU  - Caselli,Francesco
AU  - Morelli,Massimo
TI  - Bad Politicians
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8532
PY  - 2001
Y2  - October 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8532
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8532.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Francesco Caselli
Department of Economics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UNITED KINGDOM
Tel: (44) (0) 2079557498
E-Mail: f.caselli@lse.ac.uk

Massimo Morelli
Columbia University
E-Mail: mm3331@columbia.edu
AB  - We present a simple theory of the quality (competence and honesty) of elected officials. Our theory offers four main insights. Low-quality citizens have a 'comparative advantage' in pursuing elective office, because their market wages are lower than those of high-quality citizens (competence), and/or because they reap higher returns from holding office (honesty). Hence, voters may find themselves supply constrained of high-quality candidates. Second, bad politicians generate negative externalities for good ones, making their rewards from office increasing in the average quality of office holders. This leads to multiple equilibria in quality. Third, incumbent policymakers can influence the rewards of future policymakers, leading to path dependence in quality: bad governments saw the seeds for more bad governments. Fourth, quality-constrained voters look for the optimal mix of honesty and ability, and this may lead to a negative correlation between these two qualities across political entities.
ER  -