NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders

Ilyana Kuziemko, Steven D. Levitt

NBER Working Paper No. 8489
Issued in September 2001
NBER Program(s):   HE   LE   PE

The number of prisoners incarcerated on drug-related offenses rose fifteen-fold between 1980 and 2000. This paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of the implications of that dramatic shift in public policy. We show that the increase in drug prisoners led to reductions in expected time served for other crimes, especially for less serious offenses. Reductions in time served, however, increased other crimes by no more than a few percent. Moreover, incarcerating drug offenders is found to be almost as effective in reducing violent and property crime as locking up other types of offenders. We estimate that cocaine prices are 10-15 percent higher today as a consequence of increases in drug punishment since 1985. Based on previous estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cocaine, this implies a reduction in cocaine consumed of as much as 20 percent.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w8489

Published: Kuziemko, Ilyana and Steven D. Levitt. "An Empirical Analysis Of Imprisoning Drug Offenders," Journal of Public Economics, 2004, v88(9-10,Aug), 2043-2066. citation courtesy of

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