NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Political Market Structure

James E. Anderson, Thomas J. Prusa

NBER Working Paper No. 8371
Issued in July 2001
NBER Program(s):Industrial Organization

Many political markets are essentially uncontested, in the sense that one candidate raises little (or no) money and consequently has little chance of election. This presents a puzzle in the presence of apparently low barriers to entry. Using a variant of Baron (1989) we provide a theory encompassing both contested and uncontested markets. The essential addition is the presence of fixed costs of campaigning. We show that these may be quite small and yet constitute decisive barriers to entry.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w8371

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