TY  - JOUR
AU  - Horstmann,Ignatius J.
AU  - Markusen,James R.
AU  - Robles,Jack
TI  - Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8347
PY  - 2001
Y2  - June 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8347
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8347.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
James R. Markusen
Department of Economics
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO 80309-0256
Tel: 303/492-0748
Fax: 303/492-8960
E-Mail: james.markusen@colorado.edu
AB  - There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international 'trade' negotiations. Different countries, firms and activists groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor and human-rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing these questions. It employs a two-country, two-issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is 'comparative interest', analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff.
ER  -