TY  - JOUR
AU  - Hendricks,Kenneth
AU  - Pinkse,Joris
AU  - Porter,Robert H.
TI  - Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8294
PY  - 2001
Y2  - May 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8294
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8294.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Joris Pinkse
The Pennsylvania State University
Department of Economics 
608 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802
E-Mail: joris@psu.edu

Robert H. Porter
Department of Economics
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
Tel: 847/491-3491
Fax: 847/491-7001
E-Mail: r-porter@northwestern.edu
AB  - This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium bidding in a common values model that is implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We compute bid markups and rents under the alternative hypotheses of private and common values and find that the data are more consistent with the latter hypothesis. Finally, we use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction in common value auctions that bidders may bid less aggressively when they expect more competition.
ER  -