NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Financial Contracting

Oliver Hart

NBER Working Paper No. 8285
Issued in May 2001
NBER Program(s):   CF

This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

download in pdf format
   (137 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (137 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w8285

Published: Hart, Oliver. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, v39(4,Dec), 1070-1100. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Kaplan and Stromberg w8202 Venture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring
Grossman and Hart Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives
Kaplan and Stromberg w7660 Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts
Myers and Majluf w1396 Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Hart and Moore w6726 Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us