@techreport{NBERw8270,
 title = "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design",
 author = "Laurence Ball and N. Gregory Mankiw",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "8270",
 year = "2001",
 month = "May",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w8270",
 abstract = {This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy.  It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets.  The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system.  One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.},
}