TY  - JOUR
AU  - Eldenburg,Leslie
AU  - Hermalin,Benjamin E.
AU  - Weisbach,Michael S.
AU  - Wosinska,Marta
TI  - Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 8201
PY  - 2001
Y2  - April 2001
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8201
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w8201.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Benjamin Hermalin
Walter Haas School of Business
545 Student Services Building, #1900
University of California
Berkeley, CA  94720-0001
Tel: (510) 642-7575
Fax: (510) 643-1420
E-Mail: hermalin@haas.berkeley.edu

Michael Weisbach
Department of Finance
Fisher College of Business
Ohio State University
2100 Neil Ave.
Columbus, OH  43210
Tel: 614 292 3264
E-Mail: weisbach.2@osu.edu

Marta Wosinska
Food and Drug Administration
10903 New Hampshire Ave
Building 51, Room 1186
Silver Spring, MD 20993
Tel: (301) 796-3673 
Fax: (301) 847-8752 
E-Mail: Marta.Wosinska@fda.hhs.gov
AB  - This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals.  We document a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and low levels of uncompensated care increase board turnover, with this sensitivity varying by organizational type.  Poor performance, high administrative costs, and high uncompensated care lead to higher CEO turnover, with these effects again varying across different organizational types.  Overall, these results are consistent with the view that boards of directors of hospitals of different organizational forms are substantially different, and that these boards make decisions to maximize different objective functions.
ER  -