TY  - JOUR
AU  - Caplin,Andrew
AU  - Leahy,John
TI  - The Social Discount Rate
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7983
PY  - 2000
Y2  - October 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7983
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7983.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Andrew Caplin
Department of Economics
New York University
19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor
New York, NY  10012
Tel: 212/998-8950
Fax: 212/995-3932
E-Mail: andrew.caplin@nyu.edu

John V. Leahy
Department of Economics
New York University
19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor
New York, NY  10012
Tel: 212/992-9770
E-Mail: john.leahy@nyu.edu
AB  - In welfare theory it is standard to pick the consumption stream that maximizes the welfare of the representative agent.  We argue against this position, and show that a benevolent social planner will generally place a greater weight on future consumption than does the representative agent.  Our analysis has immediate implications for public policy: agents discount the future too much and the government should promote future oriented policies.
ER  -