NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Nonprofit Sector and Part-Time Work: An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data of Child Care Workers

H. Naci Mocan, Erdal Tekin

NBER Working Paper No. 7977
Issued in October 2000
NBER Program(s):   CH   LS

This paper uses a rich employer-employee matched data set to investigate the existence and the extent of nonprofit and part-time wage and compensation differentials in child care. The empirical strategy adjusts for workers' self-selection into the for-profit or nonprofit sectors, into full-time or part-time work, as well as unobserved worker heterogeneity using a discrete factor model. We find differences between the regimes (full-time for-profit, full-time nonprofit, part-time for-profit, part-time nonprofit) in the way in which human capital of the workers are rewarded. There is substantial variation in wages as a function of employee characteristics, and there is variation in wages within sectors. The results indicate that part-time jobs are good' jobs in center-based child care. Furthermore, despite the evidence supporting the labor donation hypothesis, our results indicate the existence of nonprofit wage and compensation premiums, which support the property rights hypothesis.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7977

Published: "Nonprofit Sector and Part-Time Work: An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data of Child Care Workers", The Review of Economics and Statistics, February 2003, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp.38-50. citation courtesy of

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