NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Investor Protection and Equity Markets

Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Wolfenson

NBER Working Paper No. 7974
Issued in October 2000
NBER Program(s):   CF

We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (1968) crime and punishment' framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (1976). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relationship between investor protection and corporate finance.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7974

Published: Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October. citation courtesy of

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