NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Inventors and Pirates: Creative Activity and Intellectual Property Rights

download in pdf format
   (347 K)

email paper

Herschel I. Grossman

NBER Working Paper No. 7898
Issued in September 2000
NBER Program(s):   EFG

This paper analyzes how both the value of ideas created as well as the security of intellectual property rights result from the choices of potentially creative people either to engage in creative activity or to be pirates, and from decisions of people who are engaged in creative activity to allocate time and effort to the guarding of ideas from pirating. An important result is that, although the existence of a small number of geniuses causes a larger fraction of potentially creative people to choose to be pirates and, consequently, makes intellectual property rights less secure, the existence of a small number of geniuses, holding fixed the average level of talent, can result in a larger value of ideas being created. The paper also recognizes the difference between the private value and the social value of the security of intellectual property rights.

Published: Grossman, Herschel I. "Inventors And Pirates: Creative Activity And Intellectual Property Rights," European Journal of Political Economy, v21(2,Jun), 2005, 269-285.

This paper is available as PDF (347 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us