TY  - JOUR
AU  - Djankov,Simeon
AU  - Porta,Rafael La
AU  - LopezdeSilanes,Florencio
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
TI  - The Regulation of Entry
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7892
PY  - 2000
Y2  - September 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7892
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7892.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Simeon Djankov
min
E-Mail: sdjankov@minfin.bg

Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College
Tuck School
210 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH  03755
Tel: 603/646-3739
E-Mail: rafael.laporta@dartmouth.edu

Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
EDHEC Business School
393, Promenade des Anglais BP 3116
06202 Nice Cedex 3
France
Tel: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 07
Fax: +33 (0) 4 93 18 78 41
E-Mail: Florencio.lopezdesilanes@edhec.edu

Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu
AB  - We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 75 countries. The data set contains information on the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries.  Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have fewer entry regulations. The evidence is inconsistent with Pigouvian (helping hand) theories of benevolent regulation, but support the (grabbing hand) view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
ER  -