TY  - JOUR
AU  - Epple,Dennis
AU  - Newlon,Elizabeth
AU  - Romano,Richard
TI  - Ability Tracking, School Competition, and the Distribution of Educational Benefits
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7854
PY  - 2000
Y2  - August 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7854
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7854.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Dennis N. Epple
Tepper School of Business
Carnegie Mellon University
Posner Hall, Room 257B
Pittsburgh, PA  15213
Tel: 412/268-1536
Fax: 412/268-7357
E-Mail: epple@cmu.edu

Richard Romano
University of Florida
E-Mail: richard.romano@cba.ufl.edu
AB  - To study the effects of ability grouping on school competition, we develop a theoretical and computational model of tracking in public and private schools.  We examine tracking's consequences for the allocation of students of differing abilities and income within and between public and private schools.  Private schools tend to attract the most able and wealthiest students, and rarely track in equilibrium.  Public sector schools can maximize attendance by tracking students.  Public schools retain a greater proportion of higher-ability students by tracking, but lose more wealthy, lower-ability students to the private sector. Consequently, socioeconomic status is a predictor of track assignment in public schools.  For the entire population, public-sector tracking has small aggregate effects on achievement and welfare, but results in significant redistribution from lower- to higher-ability students.
ER  -