NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle

B. Douglas Bernheim, Sergei Severinov

NBER Working Paper No. 7791
Issued in July 2000
NBER Program(s):   AG   PE

In the United States, more than two-thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children. In contrast, intra vivos gifts are usually unequal. These findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers. In this paper, we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle, based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent's altruistic preferences. The theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture, which prevails in other societies.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7791

Published: Bernheim, B. Douglas and Sergei Severinov. "Bequests As Signals: An Explanation For The Equal Division Puzzle," Journal of Political Economy, 2003, v111(4,Aug), 733-764. citation courtesy of

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