TY  - JOUR
AU  - Mulligan,Casey B.
TI  - Can Monopoly Unionism Explain Publicly Induced Retirement?
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7680
PY  - 2000
Y2  - April 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7680
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7680.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Casey B. Mulligan
University of Chicago
Department of Economics
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/702-9017
Fax: 773/702-8490
E-Mail: c-mulligan@uchicago.edu
AB  - It has long been suggested that trade unions take actions and favor public policies that reduce the quantity of labor so that union members might enjoy greater labor incomes.  Can this explain the prevalence of generous public pension programs inducing retirement?  I suggest not, by formalizing the monopoly unionism model and showing how labor's interest in reducing the quantity of labor cannot explain why the old are induced to retire rather than discouraging work among workers of all ages. Discouraging work of a subset of union workers introduces allocative inefficiencies without promoting the objectives of the monopoly union.  And, unless the old have a disproportionate influence within the union, union interests cannot explain why public pension programs are so generous.
ER  -