TY  - JOUR
AU  - Glaeser,Edward L.
AU  - Sacerdote,Bruce
TI  - The Determinants of Punishment: Deterrence, Incapacitation and Vengeance
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7676
PY  - 2000
Y2  - April 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7676
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7676.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Edward L. Glaeser
Department of Economics
315A Littauer Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-0575
Fax: 617/495-7730
E-Mail: eglaeser@harvard.edu

Bruce Sacerdote
6106 Rockefeller Hall
Department of Economics
Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755-3514
Tel: 603/646-2121
Fax: 603/646-2122
E-Mail: Bruce.I.Sacerdote@dartmouth.edu
AB  - Does the economic model of optimal punishment explain the variation in the sentencing of murderers?  As the model predicts, we find that murderers with a high expected probability of recidivism receive longer sentences.  Sentences are longest in murder types where apprehension rates are low, and where deterrence elasticities appear to be high.  However, sentences respond to victim characteristics in a way that is hard to reconcile with optimal punishment.  In particular, victim characteristics are important determinants of sentencing among vehicular homicides, where victims are basically random and where the optimal punishment model predicts that victim characteristics should be ignored.  Among vehicular homicides, drivers who kill women get 56 percent longer sentences.  Drivers who kill blacks get 53 percent shorter sentences.
ER  -