@techreport{NBERw7553,
 title = "Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits",
 author = "Jonathan Gruber",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "7553",
 year = "2000",
 month = "February",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w7553",
 abstract = {The continued rise in the number of non-elderly Americans without health insurance has led to considerable interest in tax-based policies to raise the level of insurance coverage.  This paper describes a detailed microsimulation model that has been developed to evaluate such tax-based polices, and its findings for the impact of polices on government costs and insurance coverage.  I find that while tax subsidies could significantly increase insurance coverage, even very generous tax policies could not cover more than a sizable minority of the uninsured population.  But there are several design features which can clearly make tax policy more effective: using tax credits rather than deductions; making credits refundable; and addressing the timing mismatch between when insurance purchases are made and tax refunds are received.  I also document a clear tradeoff between the scope of tax subsidies and their efficiency.},
}