TY  - JOUR
AU  - Kroszner,Randall S.
AU  - Stratmann,Thomas
TI  - Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign Contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7475
PY  - 2000
Y2  - January 2000
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7475
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7475.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Randall S. Kroszner
University of Chicago
Booth School of Business
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773/702-8779
E-Mail: randy.kroszner@chicagobooth.edu

Thomas Stratmann
Department of Economics
George Mason University
E-Mail: tstratma@gmu.edu
AB  - Do politicians tend to follow a strategy of ambiguity in their policy positions or a strategy of reputational development to reduce uncertainty about where they stand?  Ambiguity could allow a legislator to avoid alienating constituents and to play rival interests off against each other to maximize campaign contributions.  Alternatively, reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to high campaign contributions from favored interests.  We  outline a theory that considers conditions under which a politician would and would not prefer reputational development and policy-stance clarity in the context of repeat dealing with special interests.  Our proxy for reputational development is the percent of repeat givers to a legislator.  Using data on corporate political action committee contributions (PACs) to members of the U.S. House during the seven electoral cycles from 1983/84 to 1995/96, we find that legislators do not appear to follow a strategy of ambiguity and that high reputational development is rewarded with high PAC contributions.
ER  -