TY  - JOUR
AU  - Johnson,Simon
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
TI  - Coase v. the Coasians
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7447
PY  - 1999
Y2  - December 1999
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7447
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7447.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Simon Johnson
MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E52-562
Cambridge, MA 02142
Tel: 617/290-9618
Fax: 617/253-2660
E-Mail: sjohnson@mit.edu

Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu
AB  - The Coase theorem implies that, in a world of positive transaction costs, any of a number of strategies, including judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even government regulation, may be the cheapest way to bring about efficient resource allocation. Unfortunately, some Coasians have ignored the possibility that the last of these strategies may sometimes be the best. This paper compares the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s, when the judicial systems remained underdeveloped in both countries. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by an independent Securities and Exchange Commission was associated with rapid development of the stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a near collapse of the stock market. These episodes illustrate the centrality of law enforcement in making markets work, and the possible role of regulators in law enforcement.
ER  -