NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and The Costs of Laws Limiting that Choice

Asher Blass, Dennis W. Carlton

NBER Working Paper No. 7435
Issued in December 1999
NBER Program(s):   IO

This paper uses a new data source to analyze the choice of organizational form of retail gasoline stations. In recent years, gasoline stations have tended to be less likely to be owned and operated by a lessee dealer and more likely to be owned and operated by the refiner. Critics have alleged that company-operated stations are used to drive lessee dealer stations out of business in order to restrict competition. We examine the determinants of organizational form and find them to be based on efficiency not predatory concerns. We estimate the costs of recent laws prohibiting company ownership of gasoline stations.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7435

Published: Blass, Asher A. and Dennis W. Carlton. "The Choice Of Organizational Form In Gasoline Retailing And The Cost Of Laws That Limit Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, 2001, v44(2,Oct), 511-524.

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