TY  - JOUR
AU  - Porta,Rafael La
AU  - Lopez-deSilanes,Florencio
AU  - Shleifer,Andrei
AU  - Vishny,Robert W.
TI  - Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 7403
PY  - 1999
Y2  - October 1999
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7403
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w7403.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College
Tuck School
210 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH  03755
Tel: 603/646-3739
E-Mail: rafael.laporta@dartmouth.edu

Andrei Shleifer
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-9
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: 617/495-5046
Fax: 617/496-1708
E-Mail: ashleifer@harvard.edu

Robert W. Vishny
Booth School of Business
The University of Chicago
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL  60637
Tel: 773/702-2522
Fax: 773/834-1920
E-Mail: Rvishny@gmail.com
AB  - We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms.  We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.
ER  -