NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny

NBER Working Paper No. 7403
Issued in October 1999
NBER Program(s):   AP   CF

We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders, and weaker evidence of the benefits of higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders for corporate valuation.

download in pdf format
   (2041 K)

email paper

A non-technical summary of this paper is available in the April 2000 NBER digest.  You can sign up to receive the NBER Digest by email.

This paper is available as PDF (2041 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7403

Published: Rafael La porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, 06. citation courtesy of

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny w5879 Legal Determinants of External Finance
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer w6625 Corporate Ownership Around the World
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer w7523 Tunnelling
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny w7428 Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, and Reform
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny w6594 Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us