NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Expectations, Credibility, and Time-Consistent Monetary Policy

Peter N. Ireland

NBER Working Paper No. 7234
Issued in July 1999
NBER Program(s):   ME

This paper addresses the problem of multiple equilibria in a model of time-consistent monetary policy. It suggests that this problem originates in the assumption that agents have rational expectations and proposes several alternative restrictions on expectations that allow the monetary authority to build credibility for a disinflationary policy by demonstrating that it will stick to the policy even if it imposes short-run costs on the economy. Starting with these restrictions, the paper derives conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the model's steady state; monetary policy in this unique steady state involves the constant deflation advocated by Milton Friedman.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7234

Published: Ireland, Peter N., 2000. "Expectations, Credibility, And Time-Consistent Monetary Policy," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(04), pages 448-466, December. citation courtesy of

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