NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Allen Ferrell

NBER Working Paper No. 7232 (Also Reprint No. r2269)
Issued in June 2000
NBER Program(s):   LE

This paper analyzes certain important shortcomings of state competition in corporate law. In particular, we show, with respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of state takeover law, we argue, is consistent with our theory. States have adopted antitakeover statutes that have little policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in defensive tactics than endorsed even by the commentators most favorable to such tactics. Furthermore, states have elected, even though they could have done otherwise, to impose antitakeover protections on shareholders, who did not appear to favor them, in a way that left shareholders with little choice or say. Finally, we conclude by pointing out that proponents of state competition cannot reconcile their views with the evolution of state takeover law---and should therefore reconsider their unqualified support of state competition.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7232

Published: "Federalism and Corportate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takovers." Columbia Law Review, vol. 99, no.5, pp. 1168-1199 (1999)

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