NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance

Charles P. Himmelberg, R. Glenn Hubbard, Darius Palia

NBER Working Paper No. 7209 (Also Reprint No. r2254)
Issued in February 2000
NBER Program(s):   CF

Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7209

Published: Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 53, pp. 353-384, 1999. citation courtesy of

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