NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?

Alan S. Blinder

NBER Working Paper No. 7161
Issued in June 1999
NBER Program(s):   EFG   ME

Central bank credibility plays a pivotal role in much of the modern literature on monetary policy, yet it is difficult to measure or even assess objectively. A survey of central bankers was conducted to determine their attitudes on two important issues: why credibility matters, and how credibility can be built. The central bankers' answers are compared with the responses of NBER-affiliated macro and monetary economists. The two groups agree much more than they disagree. They are particularly united in their evaluations of ways to make a central bank credible -- assigning high ratings to the central bank's track record and low ratings to theoretical ideas like precommitment and incentive-compatible contracts.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7161

Published: Blinder, A. S. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, 2000, v90(5,Dec), 1421-1431. citation courtesy of

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