NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle

Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell

NBER Working Paper No. 7051
Issued in March 1999
NBER Program(s):   LE   PE

The public at large, many policymakers, and some economists hold views of social welfare that attach some importance to factors other than individuals' utilities. This note shows that any such non-individualistic notion of social welfare conflicts with the Pareto principle.

download in pdf format
   (458 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (458 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w7051

Published: Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell. "Any Non-Welfarist Method Of Policy Assessment Violates The Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy, 2001, v109(2,Apr), 281-286.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Kaplow and Shavell w9622 Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice
Kaplow and Shavell w8688 Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System
Yitzhaki and Slemrod w2451 Welfare Dominance: An Application to Commodity Taxation
Kaplow w10005 Concavity of Utility, Concavity of Welfare, and Redistribution of Income
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us