NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States

Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Olivier Deschenes

NBER Working Paper No. 6982
Issued in February 1999
NBER Program(s):   LS   PE

In the last two decades, U.S. policies have moved from the use of incentives to the use of sanctions to promote work effort in social programs. Surprisingly, except for anecdotes, there is very little systematic evidence of the extent to which sanctions applied to the abusive use of social entitlements result in greater work effort. In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment (UI) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on non-experimental data failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively seek work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system.

download in pdf format
   (956 K)

email paper

This paper is available as PDF (956 K) or via email.

Machine-readable bibliographic record - MARC, RIS, BibTeX

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6982

Published: Ashenfelter, Orley, David Ashmore and Olivier Deschenes. "Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Evidence From Randomized Trials In Four U.S. States," Journal of Econometrics, 2005, v125(1-2,Mar-Apr), 53-75.

Users who downloaded this paper also downloaded these:
Chetty w13967 Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Meyer w2546 Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells
Feldstein and Altman w6860 Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts
Chetty w11760 Why do Unemployment Benefits Raise Unemployment Durations? Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity
Auerbach and Feenberg w7662 The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers
 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us