NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance

Tarun Khanna, Krishna Palepu

NBER Working Paper No. 6955
Issued in February 1999
NBER Program(s):   CF

We examine the interaction between three kinds of concentrated owners commonly found in an emerging market: family-run business groups, domestic financial institutions, and foreign financial institutions. Using data from India in the early 1990s, we find evidence that domestic international investors are poor monitors, and that foreign institutional investors are good monitors. Whereas affiliates of those groups that attract foreign institutional investment are no more difficult to monitor than are unaffiliated firms, we find that group affiliation reduces the likelihood of foreign institutional investment. More transparent groups (where greater transparency is proxied for by a lower incidence of intra-group financial transactions) are more likely to attract such investment. We conclude that groups are difficult to monitor, and that foreign institutional investors serve a valuable monitoring function as emerging markets integrate with the global economy.

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Published:

  • Khanna, Tarun and Krishan Palepu. "Is Group Affiliation Profitable In Emerging Markets? An Analysis Of Diversified Indian Business Groups," Journal of Finance, 2000, v55(2,Apr), 867-891. ,
  • Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, 2000. "III. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP: 9. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 265-294 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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