NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries

Dennis W. Carlton, Michael Waldman

NBER Working Paper No. 6831
Issued in December 1998
NBER Program(s):   IO

This paper investigates how the tying of complementary products can be used to preserve and extend monopoly positions. We first show how a firm that is a monopolist of a product in the current period can use tying to preserve its monopoly position in future periods. We then show using related arguments how a monopolist in one market can employ tying to extend its monopoly position into a newly emerging market. The analysis focuses on the importance of entry costs and network externalities. The paper includes a discussion of antitrust implications.

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Published: Carlton, Dennis W. and Michael Waldman. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," Rand Journal of Economics, 2002, v33(2,Summer), 194-220.

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