NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Redistributive Public Employment

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, William Easterly

NBER Working Paper No. 6746
Issued in October 1998
NBER Program(s):   PE

Politicians may use disguised' redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. First, we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis; then we provide evidence that in US cities, politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device. We find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher.

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w6746

Published: Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. "Redistributive Public Employment," Journal of Urban Economics, 2000, v48(2,Sep), 219-241.

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